Force in Nature, Freedom in History.  Hegel and the neo-spinozistic project of a Natural Human History by Balsemao Pires, Edmundo
© Studia Hegeliana, vol. II (2016), pp. 23-38. ISSN: 2444-0809 
Sociedad Española de Estudios sobre Hegel
Force in Nature, Freedom in History. 
Hegel and the neo-spinozistic project of a 
Natural Human History
Fuerza en la naturaleza, libertad en la historia. 




Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal 
edbalsemao@icloud.com
RESUMEN: En esta contribución se explican 
las conexiones entre las líneas alemanas de la 
recepción de la Ethica y del Tractatus Teológico-
Políticus y la formación de las Filosofías de la 
Historia de Herder, Schelling y Hegel. En este 
estudio, se indica a la Filosofía de la Unidad 
como una corriente principal, pero se articulan 
las líneas de la recepción de la Ethica con las 
dificultades procedentes de las explicaciones 
en el Tractatus de Spinoza para la multiplicidad 
de las tradiciones religiosas, como formas his-
tóricas divergentes de percibir el Uno. Las 
 de Hegel sobre Filosofía de la Religión 
fueran examinadas desde la perspectiva de su 
significado metódico general y también desde el 
punto de vista descriptivo. Aquí se encuentran 
las claves fundamentales para la comprensión 
de la perspectiva del filósofo con respecto al 
valor de Spinoza para el método especulativo y 
en la caracterización de las épocas en la Historia 
de las Religiones Bíblicas. La crítica de Hegel 
a la Filosofía de la Unidad personificada en la 
ABSTRACT: This contribution explains the 
connections between the German lines of 
the reception of the Ethica and the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus and the formation of 
Herder’s, Schelling’s and Hegel’s Philoso-
phies of History. It refers to the Philosophy 
of Unity as a main current but articulates 
the lines of the reception of the Ethica with 
the difficulties raised by Spinoza’s explana-
tions for the multiplicity of the religious 
traditions, as divergent historical ways to 
the One, in the Tractatus. Hegel’s Lectures 
on Philosophy of Religion were scrutinized 
from the angle of their general methodical 
significance and also from the descriptive 
point of view. Here, one finds critical keys 
for the understanding of the philosopher’s 
perspective regarding Spinoza’s meaning 
to the speculative method and for the char-
acterisation of the epochs in the History of 
the Biblical Religions. Hegel’s critique of the 
Philosophy of Unity personified in Schell-
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apropiación en Schelling del conatus de Spinoza 
fue retratada con el intento de localizar el núcleo 
de la idea de una homogénea Historia Natural 
y Humana. El texto aboga que en la crítica por 
Hegel del Espinosismo de Schelling se admitirán 
las líneas alemanas de recepción de Spinoza 
como las responsables de un concepto vago 
de lo Absoluto. Tal indeterminación explica la 
ausencia de claridad sobre la diferencia entre la 
Naturaleza y el Espíritu (Historia), en particular 
en el Absoluto de Schelling, y exige una confi-
guración distinta de las «Filosofías Reales» en 
el sistema filosófico.   
PALABRAS CLAVE: FILOSOFÍA DE LA HIS-
TORIA - FILOSOFÍA DE LA NATURALEZA 
- FILOSOFÍA DE LA RELIGIÓN - CONATUS 
- ÍMPETU - DIVERSIDAD RELIGIOSA - NA-
TURALEZA - ESPÍRITU - SPINOZA; -HER-
DER - SCHELLING - HEGEL.
I. Lines of Spinoza’s German reception and the exegetical chal-
lenges of the reading of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
In the larger European context, Spinoza’s understanding of the History of the Biblical Religions in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is a turning 
point in the evolution of the concept of a Universal History from the inside 
of the theological vision of the History of Human Salvation, linking Creation, 
Revelation and Redemption. Along this development, the concept of History 
undergoes significant confrontations, facing the religious crisis, the impact of 
the scientific image of Nature and natural causation and the impressions caused 
by the findings attesting the human diversity on Earth as a consequence of the 
16th Century Maritime Discoveries. In the 17th Century, many signs of these 
confrontation lines are easy to follow in the diverse expressions of the political 
and religious learned writings on “Conjectural History” or in the speculations 
of the naturalists about the place of Man in the course of Nature’s epochs.      
I’ll consider three main lines across the particular reception of Spinoza’s 
Philosophy in Germany, in the 18th Century1. A first line, which was mainly 
[1]  Recent studies on the formation and the internal variety of the European Enlightenment 
ing’s appropriation of Spinoza’s conatus 
was envisaged in order to locate the pivotal 
point of the idea of an unbroken Natural 
and Human History. The paper argues that 
in Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s Spinozism 
the German lines of Spinoza’s reception were 
taken as responsible for a vague concept 
of the Absolute. Such vagueness explains 
the absence of clarity about the difference 
between Nature and Spirit (History), par-
ticularly in Schelling’s Absolute, and de-
mands a different configuration of the «Real 
Philosophies» in the philosophical system.
KEY WORDS: PHILOSOPHY OF HIS-
TORY - PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 
- PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION - CO-
NATUS - FORCE - RELIGIOUS DIVER-
SITY - NATURE - SPIRIT - SPINOZA; 
HERDER - SCHELLING - HEGEL.
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concerned with the meaning of the “En kai Pan” and Pantheism; a second direc-
tion dealing with the Faculties of the Soul, the importance of affection, feeling 
and emotions in Human Knowledge and a third line dedicated to the application 
of the “Philosophy of Unity” of Spinoza’s Ethica to History. These three lines 
evolved since the 1780’s, namely with Jacobi, Lessing, Goethe, Mendelssohn and 
Herder. A new generation represented by Scheling, Hölderlin, I. von Sinclair, 
Molitor and Hegel came ten years later. In 1795, in Hegel’s correspondence with 
his Tübingen friends (Schelling and Hölderlin) the importance of the study of 
Spinoza’s Philosophy is already evident (Hegel: 1969, 21-22). 
F. Schlegel’s Transcendental Philosophy (1800-01) was a project inspired 
in Spinoza’s Philosophy of Unity and pointing to a new Philosophy of Life 
conceived as the solution for the limitations of the Kantian transcendental 
Philosophy. F. Schlegel’s endeavour with his concepts of organism, totality and 
unification of the separations shows what kind of philosophical concerns guided 
the new generation in the reading of Spinoza, but also reveals a preference in the 
choice of Spinoza’s texts. Indeed, in this early attempt F. Schlegel takes mainly 
the Ethica and the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding but not 
the Tractatus. Such preference is common to those who read Spinoza through 
the Ethica, the intellectuals that read only De Deo, the first book of the Ethica, 
or the authors that knew Spinoza through P. Bayle’s article in the Dictionnaire...
Hegel’s views on Spinoza in the period of Berlin are deeply connected to the 
maturation and final expression of the German reception and especially to 
Schelling’s appropriation in his Philosophy of Identity.
I. 1. The Historicity of the Revelation in the Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus and the “Philosophy of Unity” of the De Deo 
The Tractatus embodies a dualistic explanation of the religious Biblical 
revelation and keeps the fundamental metaphysical dualisms (namely the 
opposition thought – matter / mind - body) according to a precise theoretical 
purpose, metaphysical, political and religious. The dualisms refer to basic 
distinctions that support the narrative on the History of the Revelation from 
Judaism to Christianity. The metaphysical distinctions are underpinnings of the 
Biblical differences between the Jews and the Christians and the substructures 
of the distinction between politics and religion. In the Tractatus, discussing 
the meaning of the subject of the Biblical Revelation Spinoza opposed God 
according to the Natural Light to God as Lord of the World.
have conceded to the link of “spinozism” to the “libertines” in the Dutch Republic an increasing 
seminal importance (See: Wielema: 2004; Israel: 2006). In this paper, I’ll abstract from these 
sources of Spinoza’s portrait to concentrate the focus on the German currents.   
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The systematic and the descriptive meanings of these distinctions are 
connected across the critical explanations of the Tractatus regarding the value 
of the Biblical narratives, from the Ancient to the New Testament. The politi-
cal dimension of the Revelation is disclosed in the State’s most important aim 
- the conservation of peace and security – through ceremonial rules. On the 
other hand, the Eternal Laws conceived by Natural Reason don’t have a direct 
normative influence in civil society and they are independent from History.
God’s Revelation to the Jews added to the Eternal Laws of Nature the knowledge 
of the rules of the civil society and the religious ceremonials, but according to 
the particularity of the alliance with Israel and the Election of the Jews. Spinoza’s 
Tractatus continuously deals with the value of the universality that is eternal 
but faces the concrete universality of the religious-political life of a People 
evolving from the multitude to the concept of a unique Mankind, through 
History. Thus, the Christian proclamation of a universal Love resembles the 
Amor Dei intellectualis of the Ethica but according to an imperfect image. The 
reasons for the imperfection are historical - they were generated in the History 
of Revelation itself, in the division between state and religion; the particularity 
of the Election of the Jews and Christianity;2 the multitude and the rational, 
emancipated man. Spinoza confers to the Christ the power to transcend the 
particularity of the ceremonial rules and precepts of the Jewish Torah. But, 
the apparent universality of the Christian Love to Mankind must face its own 
historical emergence from Judaism and its difference regarding the political 
life. It is a universality submitted to time and to difference. 
Consequently, it is not possible to find in the Tractatus a view on the unity 
of Reason and Revelation, the Amor Dei intellectualis, transcending the divide 
between the Jews and the Christians, State and Religion. The Philosophy of 
Unity of the Ethica has not the same systematic articulation as the historical, 
genetic descriptions of the Tractatus. 
Can one claim that the Philosophy of Unity of the Ethica is like a hypothesis 
that the History of the Biblical Religion of the Tractatus confirms through the 
concrete evolution of the political and religious institutions and always through 
the difference of the religious and the political? 
If this seems promising, Spinoza didn’t conclude the exploration of the 
way to the unity of the substance across the historical-biblical Hermeneutic of 
the History of Religion. This explains Hegel’s remarks about the absence of a 
historical-speculative view in Spinoza’s concept of substance and consequently 
[2]  In his studies on Spinoza, Leo Strauss referred already the context of the formation of 
Spinoza’s idea of an “History of Salvation”, facing the upshots of the socinianism, the image of Uriel 
da Costa and particularly La Peyrère’s Historiosophical speculations (see Strauss: 1996, 34-86). 
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his repudiation of Spinoza’s more geometrico methodical procedure and intel-
lectualist abstraction.
If the Eternal Laws are the rules of God’s eternal production of Nature ac-
knowledged by Reason, there is nothing equivalent to an immediate expression 
of God’s productivity in the historical events or in the human understanding 
of the political and religious causation through faith, sensation, imagination 
or fictional narratives. In the case of Spinoza’s Philosophy this means that the 
distinction between Nature and History must be addressed separately, even 
incurring the risk of a final decision in favour of the unavoidable irrationality 
of the historical course. 
One of the clearest theses in the Tractatus states the impossibility of a mon-
ist point of view regarding Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of History. 
Here, Spinoza says that the nations are not “by nature”, only the individuals 
are “by nature”: “Nature doesn’t create nations, but individuals”.
I’ll argue that it was this division line between Nature and History the 
forgotten theoretical issue along the mainstream of the German’s reception 
of Spinoza, before Hegel. Partly due to the importance of the Philosophy of 
Unity of the Ethica and the reduced assessment to the Tractatus the difference 
between Nature and History as an ontological and epistemological theme was 
almost erased from Herder’s, Molitor’s or Schelling’s evaluations of Spinoza. 
The imagination of an anthropological continuum was a major consequence of 
the application of the principles of the Philosophy of the Unity to the “ethical 
life” and to History. Hegel will recuperate the gap between the Ethica and the 
Tractatus, Nature and History, as a problem to be solved in the context of the 
discussion of the systematic unity of Philosophy, which the final state of the 
German Spinozism in Schelling’s “Philosophy of Identity” (or synthesis between 
“negative” and “positive Philosophy”) didn’t offer. 
I. 2. Nature as expansion of forces and the ideal of a Natural Human 
History – along the third line of the German reception of Spinoza
I. 2. 1. Herder
The enthusiasm regarding Spinoza among the group of Hegel’s friends in 
Tübingen, Schelling and Hölderlin, is documented by two letters from Schelling 
to Hegel and from Hölderlin to Hegel, both dated 1795. Along the 1800’s it was 
F. J. Molitor the representative of a serious theoretical effort in the conception 
of a Natural Human History according to an interpretation of Spinoza’s Phi-
losophy of Unity. But Herder’s Ideas about the Philosophy of History of Mankind 
(1784-91) anticipated Molitor’s sketches. Here, the notions of organism and life 
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came to the foreground of a general concept of Nature, which was intended to 
include also History and Anthropology.
In his Ideas, Herder extended the former essay Auch eine Philosophie 
der Geschichte (1774). Such project is a direct application of the Philosophy of 
Unity to Nature and to History, achieving the ideal of the Unity of Nature and 
Mankind, endangered in the Kantian precautions regarding the limits of the 
Human legitimate knowledge. The concept of force that Herder converted from 
Leibniz and the principle of a “unity of the organic composition” from G. de 
Saint-Hilaire (1795) serve the grandiose purpose of the Human Natural History. 
In the dialogue Gott Herder envisaged the organic force as an apt translation 
for Spinoza’s ideas of conatus and natura naturans. In this text, the metaphor 
of the organism and the concept of expression suggested both the way Nature 
operates throughout all its creations according to a symbolic relation ruling the 
co-reference of the whole and the parts, complementing Leibniz with Spinoza. 
The speculations about the unity of the organic composition and the views 
on the principles of the nature’s morphogenesis also occurred in the epoch 
in Goethe’s morphological essays until the 1807 text Bildung und Umbildung 
organischen Naturen, under Spinoza’s palpable inspiration.
According to Herder’s Ideas, the human inner organization with its sensi-
tive structure is adapted to a force that comes from the Earth as a living complex 
organization made of interdependent parts. Each individual being owes to the 
Earth’s organization its own morphology and functional capabilities (Herder: 
1785 - I, 7-8). The internal principle that rules the human’s life is a modification 
of the same force that animates the larger cosmos. Herder transformed the an-
cient views on Human Nature and the bodily humors of the Hippocratic Corpus, 
including the use of the concept of “culture”, adapting to his theoretical needs 
the anthropological-geological continuum. The human singularity among the 
innumerable parts of the Earth’s organism represents a force among a system 
of forces: eine Kraft im System aller Kräfte (Herder: 1785 - I, 9). Such eclectic 
conclusion modifies Spinoza’s substance as natura naturans in an intelligent 
organism similar to the neo-platonic World-Soul.
The congruent relation between the multiplicity and the unity in the actual 
world is an effect of the concrete subordination of the partial drives of the sin-
gular parts to the whole’s drive, as conveyed in the sentiments of the sentient 
beings. Even if Herder’s theory of the sentiment was a resultant of other influ-
ences, it was also an heir of Spinoza’s rehabilitation of affectivity. 
Supporting his views on Buffon’s Les Époques de la Nature Herder mentions 
a Geogenesis of Human Nature (Herder: 1785, 20). Across this Geogenesis is 
described an historical process whereby a series of beings comes into existence 
only if previous series made the scene. Nature’s inner hierarchical organization 
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and epochal sequences are possible through a scale of beings and epochs, which 
have their zenith in Mankind as the Microcosmos and across Human History.
The philosophical perspective on Natural History combines empirical historical 
data with a speculative view on the continuity of Life and the Geological 
epochs. This fictional synthesis justifies the impressive proclamation about die 
Erde als ein Schauplatz der Menschengeschichte (Herder: 1785 – I, 56) and the 
use of “culture” to refer the anthropological dimension in this Natural History 
(Herder: 1785 – I, 93-94).
Analogously to Goethe’s morphological speculations Herder conceived 
the external variety in the organization of the natural species as an expressive 
variation of the inner productive force of Life. The internal forces of Nature 
communicate through organs responsible for the exteriorization in the phenom-
enal forms of the outer world. A comment on the hypothesis of Epigenesis, the 
use of Bildung to conceptualize the expressive formations of the forces and the 
inclusion of the political communities or nations among the forces’s produc-
tions occur naturally in this context (Herder: 1785 – II, 153).  
A symptom of the importance of Spinoza’s reception through Herder’s writings 
in Germany is Kant’s reaction to the Ideas. Kant’s core critique is directed 
against the speculative character of the assumption of a uniform organism 
coupling Natural and Human History, which was the main consequence of 
the Philosophy of Unity (cf. Zammito: 1997, 122-123). Besides, Kant’s critical 
review of Herder’s book is perfectly aligned with the critique of Spinoza in the 
§ 75 of the Kritik der Urteilskraft.
I. 2. 2. F. J. Molitor
Avoiding a direct mention to Spinoza, but approving the unity of Nature 
and History as the outcome of the inner productivity of conscious and uncon-
scious forces, in a book on the “dynamic of History”, Ideen zur einer künftigen 
Dynamik der Geschichte (1805), F. J. Molitor, a philosopher interested in the Kab-
balah and Schelling’s correspondent (Koch: 2006), formulated his thesis about 
a “game of forces”, underlying the phenomenal temporal processes, basically 
structured over two polarities - the eductive and the expansive forces. History 
was conceived as a provisional resolution of the structural tension opposing 
the two principles, where it is impossible to situate a final “point of absolute 
indifference” but only relative equilibria.  What is perceptible in History has 
an equivalent in Nature. It is correct to apply to both the same notion of an 
infinite productivity of beings and forms. Ceaseless, everything is product and 
productivity - Eins in Allem und alles in Einem (Molitor: 1805, 44). The unity of 
the Human History and the Natural History corresponds to a “whole-universe” 
and this is the true foundation of a Universal History.
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Through the Universal History the spectacle of the creation and destruc-
tion of epochs is analogous of the generation and death of living beings. Each 
historical period and peoples are like individualized expressive forms of the 
two ruling forces, the expansive, subjective and positive and the eductive, 
objective and negative. The eductive force explains the finite character of the 
historical phenomena, their particular complexion. The expansive principle is 
like a subjective drive of the temporal movement (Molitor: 1805, 62-63). The 
two great epochs of the Universal History are the Ancient and the Modern. 
The Ancient represents the productive force, the subjective, and the Modern 
the eductive, objective. 
F. J. Molitor thought also that both epochs were relatively autonomous, 
even if the History evolves from the Ancient to the Modern, like a move from 
the unity to the difference, the subjective concentration of the force towards its 
division and dispersion. Thus, the Human History is comparable to a process 
of self-division of the unity or to a temporal dispersion of the natura naturans 
into the multiplicity of the natura naturata.
I. 2. 3. Schelling
In Schelling’s work the Absolute was historically conceived. This general 
impression is confirmed in detail through the analysis of the Philosophy of 
Mythology and the Philosophy of Revelation. In both works, the themes of the 
Philosophy of History were addressed according to some conventional topics 
and also preserving the analytical sequence of the historical periods of Spinoza’s 
Tractatus, Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity, assuming the Biblical History 
as the prototype of the Universal History. The internal articulation between 
both works (Mythology and Revelation) unveils a Speculative System of History 
based on the underlying agreement between History and Bible’s narration or 
between Historical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics.
In the Philosophy of Revelation, Schelling deepened the distinction between 
“negative” and “positive” Philosophy and positioned his system regarding Spi-
noza, Kant, Fichte and Hegel.
“Negative” and “positive” refer to a distinction in the philosophical ap-
proaches that entails, on one hand, a thought that relies on a reference to 
something different from itself (negative principle) and on the other hand the 
positive principle, that asserts the identity of the thought and the object. Nega-
tive Philosophy accepts the price of the platonic parricide against Parmenides 
and combines in thought, being with non-being, difference and potentiality 
with the actuality of the thought. This thinking in the realm of difference is a 
combination of knowing with non-knowing, which Schelling calls empirical 
and identifies with Kant’s transcendental method. Contrariwise, the realm of 
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pure thinking free from any reference to alterity is also independent from the 
empirical content. This freedom is equivalent to the Aristotelian “energeia”, to 
the platonic knowing of the “pantelous on” or to positive Philosophy. 
If the pure thought is apprehended as an act independent of content and 
conceived as the real source of the objectivity we are facing the roots of the 
philosophical perspectives of Spinoza, Fichte or Hegel. According to Schelling, 
the real final end of Philosophy is to become positive Philosophy. The negative 
moment is relative, provisional and conditional. But the difficult task of the 
philosophical thinking is the recognition of the balance and unity between the 
negative and the positive poles. The positive represents the emancipation from 
the contingency and is identified with Freedom. If Spinoza is a symbol of the 
positive principle in Philosophy (Schelling: 1858, 157), the author of the Ethica 
didn’t acknowledge the role of the other principle3.
In the Philosophy of Revelation Schelling started with the identification 
of the two poles of the History of Mankind – State and Religion. He was also 
concerned with the demonstration of the continuity between the History of 
Nature and the History of Mankind, which is noticeable in the passage from 
Mythology to Monotheism in the Human Religious History. His analytical 
scheme for the understanding of a self-divided unity can be portrayed in the 
formula Force in Nature and Freedom in History. 
Discussing the meaning of Christianity in the History of Religion Schell-
ing developed a double concept of History. The historicity of Christianity is 
not grasped along the external sequences of events connected to its founder’s 
biography or to the Political History of the epoch. Such mode of signifying 
History corresponds to the empirical, negative methodology. The “highest 
historicity” consists in the self-development of God discovering itself as the 
only God and as one with its Son. In the historical self-revelation of the unique 
God is disclosed the same structure that relates the negative and the positive 
in Philosophy; nature and spirit. It is in Christianity that the meaning of the 
historical process comes to its truth; not only as an episode in the religious nar-
ratives of miracles but essentially as a meta-event that links God to Mankind and 
the Nature’s Creation to a meaningful Revelation of the God becoming Man. 
The Christian message regarding a unification of the Human species under 
the Kingdom of God was announced in the Religion of Mysteries, as the Nature’s 
secret to be proclaimed at the end of History. From the initial announcement 
to the eschatological accomplishment a course evolves from the inside to the 
outside; from the secret to the manifest in accordance with the transformation 
of matter in spirit, the particular in universal, the coerced in the free. Schelling 
[3]  Spinoza ist insofern auf den tiefsten Grund aller positive Philosophie gekommen, aber sein 
Fehler ist, daβ er von diesem aus nicht fortzuschreiten wusste (Schelling: 1858, 157).
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conceives these motions as discharges of a drive (Triebkraft) innate in the living 
Nature (Schelling: 1858, 528) and responsible for the gradual transformation 
of Nature in History. The worth conceded to the inner force justifies not only 
the fascination with the unconscious but the thesis about the actus of the po-
tentiality (noch nicht Seyende) in the temporal processes (Schelling: 1858, 212), 
as an internal propulsion of Nature and History, similar to Molitor’s subjective 
force or to Spinoza’s natura naturans.     
II. Hegel’s concept of the autonomy of History and the motto “The 
One is the Whole” in his Philosophy of Religion
Under the general principle of the realization of Freedom through History, 
Hegel developed along his Berlin Lectures on Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of 
History and Philosophy of Religion a concept of History occasioning a confron-
tation with Spinoza, especially in this last collection of Lectures. Summariz-
ing, Hegel concedes that Spinoza understood the need for the rejection of the 
metaphysical dualism but criticized the fact that his concept of substance had 
an “abstract character”, because it is not possible to follow through concrete 
determinations the dialectic relation of essence and existence in the concept of 
God. Spinoza’s substance discloses one of the aspects of the self-determination 
of the Concept but is not totally identical with the Concept. The methodological 
recommendation of the Phenomenology of Spirit to convert the substance in the 
subject and the subject in the substance would be impossible according to Spi-
noza’s own understanding of the Absolute as God’s immobile substance. Hegel’s 
views about Spinoza in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy maintained 
the same ambivalence and expressed the characteristic way of the philosopher’s 
approach to the Spinoza’s substance, defined as a typical creation of the Ver-
stand. The Lectures About the Proofs of the Existence of God, particularly the 
16th Lecture (1829), reveal a similar attitude. Here, the discussion is focused on 
the meaning of the causa sui and in the interpretation of the notions of cause 
and effect, with the purpose of the demonstration of the abstract (intellectual) 
use of these notions in Spinoza’s definition of the substance. The references 
to Jacobi and to his role in the critical reception and a comparison between 
Spinoza and Parmenides attest the closeness of these Lectures to the texts in 
the group of Lectures on Philosophy of Religion.
In the Lectures on Philosophy of Religion Hegel’s diagnosis of Spinoza’s 
limitations led to the subordination of “pantheism” to a moment in the self-
determination of the Concept of Religion, contrasting with the uncritical 
enthusiastic acceptation of the “En kai Pan” in the reception line of Herder, F. 
Schlegel, Molitor or Schelling. The way Hegel correlated essence and existence 
in the Berlin Lectures relies on the understanding of the logical categories (of 
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the Logic of Essence) and on their application to the Real Philosophies (Nature 
and Spirit). It is across the logico-real uses of the categories of essence and 
existence that Hegel differentiates the various solutions (pantheism is one) to 
the problem of the relation of the unity of the substance to the empirical dif-
ferences or manifestations. 
In the Philosophy of Religion discussing the “En kai Pan” and the meaning 
of pantheism, Spinoza’s understanding of the relation of the essence to existence 
was depicted as an abstract, unconscious, blind power inherent to the finite 
beings but disconnected from a proper, dynamic relation with the Absolute. 
Continuing his appraisal, Hegel saw in the Ethica’s way to pantheism traits 
similar to the worldview of the Oriental Religion. The moral indifferentism is 
a consequence that legitimately follows. 
The most important critical argument Hegel uses against Spinoza and 
Schelling’s “Philosophy of Identity” states that both philosophers conceived the 
“En kai Pan” as a blind productive force without content, both detached the 
power of the substance from the knowing of its concrete contents. Consequently, 
Spinoza’s substance cannot be a knowing subject. It is such non-subjective, non-
spiritual character of the substance that explains its family resemblance with the 
oriental principles regarding the influence of the Divine in the finite existence.
Hegel’s critical explanation of the divorce between the Will and the 
Knowledge, the drive and the concrete determinations of Spinoza’s substance 
puts at risk the plan to convert the Philosophy of Unity of the Ethica in the 
metaphysical foundation of both Real Philosophies and of the Philosophy of 
History. But this was precisely the aim of Spinoza’s sympathetic line of reception 
in Germany along the 18th Century, including Schelling. On the other hand, 
the placement of Spinoza’s substance at the same side of the worldviews of the 
Oriental Religion also reveals the incompatibility of the Philosophy of Unity 
with Christianity, a critical consequence Hegel infers, which is only similar in 
its immediate appearance to Jacobi’s critique of Spinoza.
Hegel’s evaluation of Spinoza in the Philosophy of Religion unveils the prob-
lem of the consistency between the method of the Ethica (unity of substance) 
and the descriptive content of the Tractatus (concrete historical determinations), 
which Spinoza didn’t address properly and Herder or Schelling simply ignored. 
They disregarded the theoretical difficulties of a direct application of the mixed 
concept of a force-substance to epochal, ethical-religious determinations without 
the consideration of the real activity of knowing across the concrete historical 
events. But without the process and the contents of an historical knowing there 
is no recognizable force and a force that is unrecognizable cannot be defined 
or referred. 
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In the 1824 version of the Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, in the notes 
on “immediate Religion”, division A. a) “metaphysical concept”, Hegel reas-
sessed Jacobi’s identification of the Spinozism with pantheism and concluded 
that “pantheism” was ascribed vaguely to many philosophical and religious 
doctrines using the words Being, Dasein, finite, infinite, “each” and “whole” 
that excluded the mediation of Thought or Knowing. The essential motive of 
Hegel’s resistance regarding the German reception line of Spinoza becomes 
sharper when he assumes that the absence of a concept of mediation of Being 
and Thought is here the unforgivable mistake. “Pantheism” means that God 
or the infinite is manifest in each finite being as a reason to be: Dies Dasein 
enthählt in sich das Sein, und dies Sein im Dasein, das ist Gott. But, how can 
one distinguish between this “pantheism” and Parmenides’s thesis that only 
the Being is? According to both views (pantheism and Parmenides) Being and 
being determinate are separate things, immediately confronting each other, 
but only to conclude afterwards that they are identical, as if their relation were 
the same as the content and the container4. 
“Pantheism” means truly the thesis that God is in the totality of beings 
only if one recognizes God along the progression of the thought about this 
finite existence. Thought is the unique medium of the self-explanation of God’s 
manifestation. Spinoza’s concept of the substance’s modi and the distinction 
between the substance in itself and the modi are not satisfactory means to give 
a proper picture of the relation of the totality of the finite beings and the unique 
substance. This is the justification for Hegel’s final critical judgement, which af-
fects not only Spinoza but also the German reception: Spinoza’s substance means 
the affirmation of God in the empirical existence as an empty power (Macht). 
It is not irrelevant the use of the concept of power in the context. It represents 
the potency of the non-mediated. The trouble arising from the representation of 
this power, force or potency is precisely the absence of its concrete application, 
which is a proof of the abstract separation of the Will from the Knowledge. But, 
if a power without concrete application is powerless, it is because there is no 
such thing as a non-mediated power or a will without knowledge. The reason 
for the use of the concept of force as an all-purpose concept applying to Nature 
and to History, indifferently, is now clear. The pure affirmation of the presence 
of God in the empirical existence, as a power, such empty identification, is the 
unique valid definition of this “pantheism”. Thus, underlying the unity of the 
natural and the historical determinations, of force in Nature and freedom in 
History, of the modern pantheism, is the idea of an abstract power, without 
[4]  In the Lectures on Philosophy of History, Hegel enlarged the depth of the comparison 
of Spinoza’s substance to the Chinese, Indian, Eleatic, Pythagorean and the general principles of 
the modern Metaphysics (Hegel: 1994, 175). 
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subject or content, and a religious view, which is impossible to conciliate with 
Christianity. Hegel called this force or power “unfree Freedom”, precisely be-
cause it represents the separation of the Will and the Knowledge. 
A further inference from these premises of the philosopher’s interpretation 
of Spinoza’s “En kai Pan”, as the abstract power facing the concrete reality and 
independent of the thinking mediation, is the political consequence. Hegel 
conceives the Spinozistic pantheism as a modern philosophical envelope of 
worldviews akin to the Oriental Religion and, with some adaptations, to the 
oriental political despotism or Theocracy, the extreme type of the unlimited 
sovereignty that extracts the rule of the State exclusively from the arbitrary will 
of the sovereign as this natural individuum5. In the 1824 and 1827 versions of 
the Lectures the parallel between Oriental Religion (especially the Brahman-
ism of the “Religion of Phantasy” and those determinations common to the 
Brahmanism and Judaism), and Spinoza is an ingenious way to save the partial 
truth of the doctrine of the Ethica, placing it in the evolution of the religious 
consciousness. 
Through the integration of Spinoza’s substance in the frame of his own 
Philosophy of the History of Religion, Hegel gave an interpretative key to his 
relation to Spinoza and an unexpected orientation in the conundrum of the 
articulation of the Ethica with the Tractatus. Additionally, his critical approach 
to Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity as the achieved expression of the German 
Spinozism shows very well that Hegel begins his idea of the concrete historical 
precisely in the point where the German views on the “En kai Pan” stopped. 
Spinoza’s substance gave the urge to the Dialectic concept of History. In Hegel’s 
views speculative thinking and concrete historical thinking are two aspects of 
the same medal, but not like in Schelling’s representation.
From these premises one can now conclude. Hegel refused a homogenous 
intellectual principle indifferently applied to Nature and History, exemplified 
in the concept of force as an heir of the German eclectic reception of Spinoza. 
The Absolute really operating in History owes its productivity to the concrete 
determinations of the Concept in the dialectic of the essence and existence 
[5]  With a slight correction to the prior equivalence between Spinoza’s views and the 
oriental views, Hegel wrote his famous thesis about the oriental despot: Dies ist das Prinzip der 
orientalischen Welt, daβ die Individuen noch nicht ihre subjektiven Freiheit in sich gewonnen haben, 
sondern sich als Akzzidenzen an der Substanz halten, die aber nicht eine abstrakte Substanz ist, wie 
die Spinozas, sondern Präsenz hat für das natürliche Bewuβtsein in der Weise eines Oberhauptes, 
daβ sie alles nur ihm angehörig sehen... Wir können in der orientalischen Welt die Herrschaft eine 
Theokratie nennen. Gott ist weltlicher Regent, und der weltlicher Regent ist Gott (Hegel: 1994, 
246). The oriental despot represents the concrete productive force of the substance according to 
its natural, individual manifestation.
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and not to a blind impetus abstractly defined and identified with God. Hegel’s 
proposal entails a logical differentiation between the two Real Philosophies 
with consequences in the coherence of the philosophical system. 
Nature is not yet Spirit. The development of this thesis in the context of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Law explains the radical rejection of the naturalism of 
“Natural Law” and the ideas about a “natural state of Mankind” as valid hy-
pothesis for the study of the beginnings of Human History. It is not sufficient 
to say that there are two real dimensions of the manifestation of the Concept, 
Nature and Spirit (History), Force and Freedom. Hegel went much further, 
substantiating the thesis historically, showing that Freedom in History entails 
a gradual and epochal differentiation process of History itself from Nature. If 
Hegel achieved this purpose, then Schelling’s critique of his former friend in 
the Philosophy of Revelation misses the mark and turns against him (Schelling: 
1858, 204). Additionally, the statement Nature is not yet Spirit suspends the 
naïve views on an anthropological continuum.  
Later, the Dialectical solution for the problem of the relation between the 
concrete historical sequences and a principle of speculative unity will put the 
Hegelianism in confrontation with Positivism and, lastly, the philosophical 
view on History in tense dialogue with modern Historiography.   
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